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Freud's Ego in the Cockpit 
FORUM 
FREUD'S EGO IN THE COCKPIT 
Kelsie M .  O'Bryan 
Abstract 
In the early 1900's, Sigmund Freud theorized the three parts of a person's personality: the id, the ego, and 
the superego. The ego controls the id's desires because they may have consequences or not be socially acceptable. 
A person experiences defense mechanisms to protect his or her ego. Although psychologists view defense mechanisms 
as a typically healthy way to deal with a problem, the aviation industry sees them as dangers to the safety of flights. 
Many aircraft accidents have occurred because the pilot had a strong ego, and was unconsciously defending it. Crew 
members must learn to recognize defense mechanisms in themselves and in their crew. Once recognized, an antidote 
should be applied. Usually, following prescribed procedures by the Federal Aviation Administration or the airline can 
help counter the effects of a strong ego. This can make for a safer cockpit. 
Psychology 
Introduction: The First Ps~choanalvst 
Sigmund Freud (1 856-1 939) was amedical doctor, 
psychologist, and an influential thinker of the early 
twentieth century, but he is best known as the founder of 
psychoanalysis. (Romanian Association for Psychoanalysis 
Promotion, 1999) According to Time Magazine, the 
fhdamental idea of his new science of the time is that, "all 
humans are endowed with an unconscious in which potent 
sexual and aggressive drives, and defenses against them, 
struggle for supremacy, as it were, behind a person's back." 
(Gay, 1999) Freud studied stages of development, dream 
interpretation, and personalities. He also began the practice 
of 'couch therapy.' Many of his ideas have been deemed as 
'unscientific' by modem psychologists, but some of Freud's 
theories still apply to today's world, especially his theory of 
personality. (Thornton, 200 1)  
Psvchoanalvtic Theory of Personality 
According to Sigmund Freud, the personality is a 
tripartite, or composed of three elements that work together 
to create complex human behaviors: the id, the ego, and the 
superego. (He&er, 1999) 
The most primitive element of the personality, the 
id, is present fiom birth. The id operates according to the 
pleasure principle; its two goals are to seek pleasure and to 
avoid pain. The id does not rely on reality or logic, but 
rather demands immediate satisfaction for its basic needs, 
including those for life (eros) and for aggressionldeath 
(thanatos). The id is important to infants because they 
cannot meet their basic needs themselves. If they are hungry 
or feeling unsafe, the id makes them cry to have their needs 
addressed. 
Around age three, the second component of 
personality, the ego, develops. In 1923, Freud called the 
ego, ''that part of the id which has been modified by the 
direct influence of the external world." Unlike the id, the 
ego understands that others also have needs and desires, and 
that actions have consequences. "The ego operates based on 
the reality principle, which strives to satisfy the id's desires 
in realistic and socially appropriate ways." (McLeod, 2007) 
The ego is not a sense of right or wrong. It simply seeks an 
end that does not harm itself or the id. Usually, the ego can 
appease the id's impulses through delayed gratification, 
when the behavior can take place at an acceptable time and 
place. 
A child develops his or her superego by the time he 
or she is five years old. This part of the personality consists 
of a person's morals acquired fiom caregivers and from 
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society. The superego controls feelings of right and wrong. 
Many consider this to be a person's conscience. It works to 
suppress the id's unacceptable urges, like those for sex and 
aggression. The superego also tries to force the ego to act on 
idealistic/moralistic standards, rather than just realistic ones. 
(Cherry, The Id, Ego, and Superego: The Structural Model 
of Personality, 2005) 
Sigmund Freud preached that the key to a healthy 
personality is to maintain a balance between the id, the ego, 
and the superego. The ego is constantly seeking this healthy 
balance. It must be the strongest element so, "it can satisfy 
the needs of the id, not upset the superego, and still take into 
consideration the reality of every situation." (Hefher, 
1999) Freud termed the ego's ability to function despite 
these contradicting forces 'ego strength.' "A person with 
good ego strength is able to effectively manage these 
pressures, while those with too much or too little ego 
strength can become too unyielding or too disrupting." 
(Hefher, 1999) This research paper will focus largely on 
the ego. 
Protecting the Ego 
When the ego cannot handle the id's demands, the 
constraints of reality, and the superego's moral standards, 
the person experiences anxiety. According to Freud, 
"anxiety is an unpleasant inner state that people seek to 
avoid." Anxiety is the first sign that something is wrong, 
and the person will then exhibit defense mechanisms to 
protect his or her ego. This is typically done unconsciously, 
but it may also happen knowingly. Although it is a distortion 
of reality, defense mechanisms can simply be a way to adapt 
to a situation in order for a person can function normally. At 
the same time, they can become unhealthy when overused 
to avoid confronting problems. Many exist today, but 
Sigmund Freud, and later his daughter Anna, identified the 
basic nine defense mechanisms: repression, denial, 
rationalization, projection, reaction formation, 
intellectualization, regression, displacement, and 
sublimation. (Clark, 2004) 
First, repression is also known as 'motivated 
forgetting.' It acts to keep certain memories out of 
conscious awareness, but they continue to influence a 
person's behavior. This may have occurred if a person has 
a phobia, but doesn't know where it originated fiom. Denial 
is repression taken to an extreme level. "Denial is an 
outright refusal to admit or recognize that something has 
occurred or is currently occurring." It acts to protect the ego 
fiom situations it cannot deal with, for example, a doctor's 
diagnosis of a terminal illness. (Hefier, 1999) 
Next, rationalization is the defense mechanism that 
involves making excuses to defend behavior, simultaneously 
avoiding the true reasons for it. This protects the ego's self- 
esteem by blaming fault on someone or something else, like 
when a speeder blames his or her speeding ticket on the 
police officer, a lack of signs, or the speedometer. Similarly, 
projection is placing your own unacceptable qualities, 
feelings, or impulses onto someone else. This will allow a 
person to express and criticize the impulse, but without the 
ego recognizing it. The threat is eliminated, and self-esteem 
is maintained. 
Reaction formation is taking the opposite belief, 
impulse, or behavior because the true belief causes anxiety. 
A modern example of making a reaction formation is when 
a secretly gay man engages in many heterosexual affairs to 
disguise his homosexuality. The person goes overboard in 
the other direction. 
Next, intellectualization occurs when a person 
avoids seeming unacceptable emotions by focusing on the 
intellectual aspects of the situation. Like all defense 
mechanisms, intellectualization can have positive 
consequences. If a rape victim were to experience 
intellectualization, she would educate herself on information 
and statistics of rape, take self-defense classes, and possibly 
even teach these things to other women and men. Even 
though she is making her traumatic experience into a 
positive outcome, it is unhealthy to repress the emotional 
side of the event. Eventually, those feelings will have to be 
addressed. 
Regression is when a person moves back in 
development to a time when he or she felt safe and secure, 
often childhood. It may be as inconspicuous as a student 
taking his or her old stuffed animal to college, or as extreme 
as an adult throwing a temper tantrum in public. 
Finally, displacement involves taking out 
hstrations, feelings, or impulses on people or objects that 
are less threatening. The less threatening option is referred 
to as the scapegoat. This happens every day. An example of 
displacement is when a man has a stresshl day at work. 
Instead of arguing with his boss and potentially getting 
fired, he goes home and yells at his wife or throws an 
inanimate object to relieve his anger. In contrast, 
sublimation is when a person acts out his or her impulses in 
a socially acceptable form. A person with a great need for 
order may become a scientist; or a person with excess anger 
could choose to be a professional football player. People 
who succumb to sublimation are often admired for finding 
their 'true calling.' Freud viewed this defense mechanism 
as a sign of maturity, allowing people to protect their egos 
while functioning normally in a very socially acceptable, 
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even productive, way. (Cherry, Defense Mechanisms, 2006) 
Aviation 
How Ego Affects the Cocbit 
Like every other profession, pilots are affected by 
their ego and their need to protect it. The Federal Aviation 
Administration's (FAA) Aviation Instructor 's Handbook 
cautions about the dangers of defense mechanisms in the 
cockpit. Ultimately, defense mechanisms are a distortion of 
reality. "Thus, they alleviate the symptoms, not the causes, 
and do not solve problems." (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2009) The Handbook goes on to say that 
defense mechanisms are unconscious, and therefore, "not 
subject to normal conscious checks and balances." In 
addition, it says that once the person is aware that he or she 
is exhibiting a defense mechanism, his or her behavior 
becomes, "an ineffective way of satisfying a need." 
Different fiom Freud's view, the FAA sees ego and defense 
mechanisms as a threat to safety. 
According to Commercial Aviation Safety, 
"Interactions [among crew members] are influenced by two 
important variables, namely, peer pressure and ego." (Wells 
& Rodrigues, 2001) Refening to Freud's definition of ego, 
peer pressure is very similar. A young or inexperienced 
pilot's id feels the need to prove itself to the superior 
captain. It is .the ego's responsibility to do this at an 
appropriate place and time. Defense mechanisms will 
protect the pilot's self-esteem, but also, potentially alter the 
safety of the flight. The book says the pilot may make the 
wrong decision because, "the safe course of action may be 
perceived as involving an unacceptable loss of face." 
Commercial Aviation Safety recognizes that a moderate 
amount of ego has a positive effect on motivation and 
performance. Obviously, a pilot must be confident in his or 
her abilities to safely execute flights. Ego is necessary in the 
cockpit, but at the same time, "a strong ego.. .may produce 
good leadership qualities in emergency situations, but it may 
also result in poor crew or resource management." The 
domineering personality that comes with a strong ego may 
discourage input &om others or, "may disregard established 
procedures, previous training, or good airmanship." The 
FAA's Advisory Circular 60-22 identifies this strong ego 
characteristic as one of the five hazardous attitudes, macho. 
This kind of pilot's motto is 'I can do it.' "Pilots with this 
type of attitude will try to prove themselves by taking risks 
in order to impress others (14); usually, ignoring safety. 
According to the Advisory Circular, hazardous attitudes like 
this one must be recognized, and then its antidote must be 
applied. In this case, the pilot should counter his strong ego 
with the phrase, 'taking chances is foolish.' (Federal 
Aviation Administration, 199 1) 
In a professional crew setting, the most dangerous 
aspect of ego may be how it affects communications. 
According to a human factors study, "being strong, being 
right, maintaining his status and reputation [are all] critical 
to the pilot's self-image." (Freud's Personality Factors, 
2002) A captain's ego can prevent him or her from 
discussing the best course of action with the crew or from 
admitting mistakes because it could show a flaw in his or 
her abilities. (Captains' egos are likely to be especially 
strong if they have experience as a military fighter pilot 
because they were initially trained to be self-reliant.) At the 
same time, a first officer's ego can keep him or her from 
pointing out possible errors that cause accidents for fear of 
being disrespectful or embarrassed. A cockpit full of ego 
and without constructive communication can be a recipe for 
disaster. 
Just like instructors have to be on the lookout for 
defense mechanisms in their students, crew members should 
monitor one another. These are usually brought on by a 
personal crisis or another stressful event in the 
crewrnember's life. For example, he or she may be going 
through a divorce or be financially stressed. The cause could 
be almost anything. The Aviation Instructor's Handbook 
identifies some symptoms of defense mechanisms: "a 
change in personality, angry outbursts, depression, [. . .] 
social withdrawal, preoccupation with certain ideas, or an 
inability to concentrate." If another crewmember witnesses 
defense mechanisms, he or she is advised to try to discuss 
the issue with the affected crewmember. "The main 
objective should be to restore motivation and self- 
confidence." (Federal Aviation Administration, 2009) 
People's egos are fiagile, and must be approached in 
delicate ways, although, if necessary, a professional 
counselor should be recommended. Although the NTSB has 
never cited the cause of an aircraft accident to be due to the 
'pilot's ego,' certain phrases signal that that may have been 
the case: "pilot failed to overshoot", "descended below 
minima", "failed to divert to an alternate", "attempted 
operation beyond experiencelability level", "continued flight 
into known adverse weather", etc. (Wells & Rodrigues, 
2001) 
E x m l e s  of Interfering Egos 
Proof that pilot's strong egos can compromise the 
safety of a flight can be found in many National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reports. It is especially 
evident in the following four accidents: the Avjet Aspen 
Crash in 2001, the Tenerife Airport Disaster, Garuda 
Indonesia Flight 200, and Pinnacle Airlines Flight 370 1. 
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On March 29,2001, a Gulfstream I11 operated by 
Avjet Corporation was on a chartered flight from the Los 
Angeles International Airport (KLAX) to the Aspen-Pitkin 
County Airport in Aspen, Colorado (KASE). The flight 
initially left KLAX forty-one minutes late due to the 
tardiness of the chartering passengers. A Notice to Airmen 
(NOTAM) was issued to the first officer during his preflight 
briefing stating that the instrument approach procedure was 
not authorized at night, although the crew continued the 
approach after the end of civil twilight, estimated as thirty 
minutes after sunset by the crew. On the approach, the crew 
reported the runway in sight to the air traffic controller 
working the airplane, but their flight path indicates they 
never saw it. The NTSB determined the cause of the 
accident to be, "the flight crew's operation of the airplane 
below the minimum decent altitude (MDA) without an 
appropriate visual reference for the runway." Even though 
all of their information indicated they should go missed, the 
crew continued the approach. This led to the death of fifteen 
people. 
On the Avjet flight, the pilots obviously had the 'I 
can do it' attitude that comes with a strong ego. Combined 
with pressure fi-om the paying customers, the captain and 
first officer chose to ignore the curfew at KASE, lie to the 
controller about seeing the runway, and descend below 
MDA into an area of terrain without being able to see it. 
They had only flown into this particular airport twice, and 
only during daylight conditions. Some believe the crew was 
experiencing the defense mechanism rationalization. If they 
were, the pilots wanted it to seem like executing the 
approach illegally was due to pressure £tom the paying 
customers (this did have some affect on the situation). In 
reality, the pilots' bad decision-making was probably 
because oftheir macho attitudes. They wanted to prove they 
could do it. This overconfidence caused by their strong egos 
had dire consequences for everyone on board. (2001 Avjet 
Aspen Crash, 2003) 
On March 27, 1977, along with many other 
airplanes, Pan Am Flight 1736 and KLM Flight 4805, both 
Boeing 743, were diverted to Tenerife's Los Rodeos 
Airport in the Canary Islands after their airport of intended 
landing, the Las Palmas Airport, incurred a small-scale 
terrorist attack. Later that day, Las Palmas Airport reopened 
to traffic. Because of the unusual congestion, aircraft at 
Tenerife had been parked on taxiways, blocking them from 
use. For this reason, the controller on duty was back-taxiing 
aircraft down the runway to get in position for departure. At 
this time, he instructed KLM 4805 to taxi to the end of the 
runway, make a one-hundred and eighty degree turn, and 
hold for takeoff. He also taxied Pan Am 1736 down the 
runway, but that aircraft was instructed to exit the runway 
on a taxiway to their left. By this time, a thick fog had rolled 
in, preventingthe tower controller from seeingthe airplanes, 
and the airplanes from seeing each other. When KLM 4805 
was positioned for takeoff on the runway, the captain 
proceeded to release the brakes and set full power. His first 
officer stopped him, saying, "Wait, we don't have 
clearance!" (Kilroy, 1997) The captain was experiencing 
the macho hazardous attitude, and possibly also anti- 
authority and impulsivity. The first officer then received 
departure, but not takeoff clearance, and replied, "We're 
now at takeoff," as the captain advanced the throttles. The 
controller then told them to standby for takeoff, but the 
transmission was 'stepped on' by the Pan Am reporting still 
on the runway. Sadly, five-hundred eighty-three people 
perished fi-om the decision of the KLM 4805 captain to 
takeoff without clearance. (Aviation Sri Lanka, 2008) 
The KLM 4805 captain's strong ego and want to 
get off the ground after a long unexpected delay affected his 
ability to problem solve. He ignored procedure and made his 
own decision. The first officer tried to stop him, but after 
being assertive once and unsure of himself due to little 
experience in the Boeing 747, he did not have the courage 
in him to do it again. Some believe the captain was 
experiencing reaction formation. He knew he did not have 
takeoff clearance, but he wanted to believe he did because 
the lack of clearance made his flight later, causing him more 
stress. He chose the belief and behavior opposite to the truth 
to appease his ego. Pilots of both aircraft saw the accident 
coming just seconds before it happened. KLM 4805 
attempted to get airborne early, tail striking the runway, and 
Pan Am 1736 tried to taxi off the runway, into the grass, but 
their efforts were too late. 
Garuda Indonesia Flight 200, was an Indonesian 
domestic flight, traveling from Bandara Soekarno Hatta 
International Airport to Yogyakarta Adi Sucipto Airport on 
March 07, 2007. Ten miles from the Yogyakarta Adi 
Sucipto Airport, the crew was given clearance for a visual 
approach to runway 09. Ignoring authority, the captain 
continued the instrument approach. The recommended top 
of descent at this point was 2,500 feet, but the Boeing 737 
was almost at an altitude of 4,000 feet. The captain chose to 
descend rapidly to achieve glide slope, and the airspeed 
increased tremendously. In his approach, the Ground 
Proximity Warning System sounded fifteen times, and the 
first officer repeatedly called for go-around. The captain's 
strong ego told him that he could complete the approach and 
land the airplane. Against all common sense, but apparent 
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by his actions, he must have been thinking 'I can do it.' The 
aircraft eventually touched down eighty-seven knots faster 
than landing speed, and the first officer requested a go- 
around yet again. The captain was determined to be 
successful; he never intended to compromise the safety of 
the flight. In a post-crash interview, he said, "At the (time of 
the crash) I used all ofmy might to save the flight mission." 
(Garuda Indonesia Flight 200 & Captain John Bartels, 2008) 
Ultimately, the aircraft overran the runway, killing twenty- 
two people. 
On Garuda Indonesia Flight 200, it has been 
speculated that the captain was motivated to get on the 
ground by a new Garuda Airlines company policy. Since 
fuel costs the company money, it gave pilots who saved it a 
conservation bonus in their paycheck. (Garuda Indonesia 
Flight 200,2007) The captain may have been experiencing 
rationalization. In his head, he could probably justifl 
sacrificing the safety of the flight for extra money in his 
pocket, as long as the outcome was positive. Unfortunately, 
he let his bad decisions go to such an extreme level, 
continually refusing to do a go-around, that they were 
unrecoverable. The captain was obviously at fault, but the 
first officer was not fkee of blame. Garuda Indonesia had a 
company policy that allowed the first officer to take control 
ofthe aircraft when the captain ignored his recommendation 
to go around. Although the first officer did suggest the 
proper correction, he did not take charge and fix the 
situation. Just like the captain, the first officer's ego 
probably affected his ability to problem solve as well. He 
did not want to be assertive by taking the controls, and then 
be wrong. That would be detrimental to a second-in- 
command's self-image. But, if he had stepped up, a second 
approach could have been successful. (Garuda Indonesia 
Flight 200,2009) 
Finally, a blatant disregard for rules and procedures 
can be the most obvious identifier of a strong ego and can 
turn into the most dangerous of situations, especially when 
the ego prevents the person fkom admitting his or her 
mistakes. On October 14, 2004, Pinnacle Airlines Flight 
3701, a Bombardier CL-600-2B 19 (CRJ 200), was operating 
to reposition the aircraft fiom Little Rock, Arkansas (KLIT) 
to Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport (KMSP) for a 
scheduled passenger flight the next morning. At the time of 
the accident, thankfully, only two crewmembers were 
aboard the aircraft. This lack of feeling responsible for the 
normal fifty lives on board gave the crew the fieedom to 
attempt risky maneuvers and push the airplane and 
themselves past their limits. On the way up to their original 
requested altitude of 33,000 feet, the crew made three erratic 
nose-up pitch inputs and several rudder inputs to experience 
G's. The stick shaker protection kept trying to stop this, but 
they continued to ovenide it. The crew requested an altitude 
of 41,000 feet, which was the CRJ 200's service ceiling in 
perfect conditions. On that flight, based on the atmospheric 
conditions and aircraft's weight, their maximum altitude for 
the 500 feet per minute climb they set the autopilot to was 
38,700 feet. (What Went Wrong: The Crash of Flight 3701, 
2006) The crew was attempting to 'join the 4-1-0 club.' 
This is an unofficial group of pilots who are proud to have 
reached the limit of 41,000 in a CRJ 200. The pilots 
achieved club status, but they would not make it back on the 
ground alive to tell the story. 
Upon reaching their new requested altitude, the 
controller queried Pinnacle 3701 about their aircraft type 
because she was not accustomed to seeing CRJ 200's at an 
altitude of 4 1,000 feet. The captain told her, "We don't have 
any passengers on board so we decided to have a little fun 
and come on up here.. .this is actually our service ceiling." 
(National Transportation Safety Board, 2007) From the 
captain's bragging, it is obvious that the crew is proud of 
their macho attitude. Just seconds after showing off, they 
realized that the airplane could not maintain its service 
ceiling. Its airspeed was becoming dangerously slow; the 
pitch was abnormally high; and the engines could no longer 
function after being pushed to 600 degrees above their 
maximum operating temperature and without sufficient 
oxygen to kel them. After five activations of the 
stickshaker, the CRJ 200 aerodynamically stalled, rolled into 
its left wing, and flamed out both engines. 
To protect their egos, the pilots of Pinnacle 3701 
immediately began experiencing denial. If they would have 
admitted the double engine failure to the airtraffic controller 
right away, they could have glided to six different airports 
and landed successfully. They didn't want to believe that 
they had made a mistake, so they chose to hide that 
information and instead, incorrectly executed the checklists 
for engine restart. Regardless of their actions, the right 
engine probably could have never restarted. Because it was 
operating beyond its limits at 300 degrees Celsius above its 
recommended temperature, "the ends of the high pressure 
turbine blades had liquefied, resolidifying on the low 
pressure blades behind them." (What Went Wrong: The 
Crash of Flight 370 1,2006) By the time they admitted their 
failure to the controller, it was too late. Pinnacle Flight 370 1 
crashed two and a halfmiles short ofthe runway at Jefferson 
City Airport, killing both crew members on board. (National 
Transportation Safety Board, 2007) The pilots let their egos 
get in the way of their training and good decision-making 
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skills. They made the initial mistake of pushing the aircraft 
past its limits, but then failed to correct it by simply 
admitting their error to someone who could help, the 
controller. As in many similar situations, sadly, the pilots' 
strong egos cost them the ultimate pricetheir  lives. 
Antidotes to Strong Egos 
Strong egos can be corrected by following 
prescribed procedures and rules. The FAA publishes 
regulations, and airliners have standard operating procedures 
to be followed to try to ensure safety in flight. According to 
Darren Smith, an experienced instructor, ego affects a 
pilot's flying discipline, including his or her decision- 
making skills. Among others, Mr. Smith suggests recurrent 
training and practicing good habits to maintain a safe flying 
discipline. Hopefidly, in an emergency situation, the 
familiar feeling of following procedures will trigger the 
proper strategy to fix the problem. (Smith, 2005) A pilot's 
true capabilities can shine in an emergency to do everything 
he or she can to solve the problem, or his or her strong ego 
can come out to prevent good decision-making. 
Conclusion 
In the early 1900's, when Freud theorized the 
psychoanalytic theory of personalities, he could have never 
imagined it would apply to people flying an airplane, but it 
does. The ego and the defense mechanisms a person exhibits 
to protect it can affect the person's decision-making ability, 
no matter what he or she is doing. As seen in the previous 
airplane accidents, when a person lets his or her ego 
ovemde rational thinking, it can have dire consequences: 
lives. For this reason, crews must be trained to recognize 
unwanted behavior due to egos in them self and in crew 
members. Identifling the problem is the first step in fixing 
it, and then an antidote may be implemented. .) 
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